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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a lawyer to use a 
witness’s criminal conviction for impeachment.1 But the Rule imposes 
several limits on this kind of credibility attack. For example, it limits the 
use of convictions over ten years old.2 It also requires review under the 
standard in Rule 403 for most witnesses, so that a conviction is excluded 
if prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.3 And most 
importantly, Rule 609(a)(1)(B) says that the criminal defendant cannot be 
impeached by a conviction unless the probative value of impeachment 
“outweighs its prejudicial effect.”4 
There are several assumptions underlying this last part of the Rule. 
One assumption is that a qualifying criminal conviction means lesser 
credibility for the witness, no matter what the crime.5 Justice Holmes gave 
a clear explanation of this concept. A conviction, he said, shows a “general 
readiness to do evil” from which the jury can “infer a readiness to lie in a 
particular case.”6 Alternatively, the “background” theory allows the jury 
to assess the plausibility of the defendant’s testimony by considering his 
past. This is a kind of reasoning that seems to allow the jury to recognize 
general propensity to crime,7 although the Rule is designed to prohibit this 
inference. And another assumption is that the fact of conviction can cause 
the defendant to suffer prejudice, ranging from mild to severe, that cannot 
be avoided completely by an instruction to the jury.8 These are intuitive 
assumptions, and they have not all been extensively examined in 
quantitative ways, although there are some studies of the overall effects 
1. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
2. FED. R. EVID. 609(b). See United States v. Estes, 994 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming 
exclusion of older conviction). 
3 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A). 
4. FED. R. EVID 609(a)(1)(B). The seminal case applying this section was United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
5. See, e.g., Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cty., 856 F.3d 795, 817 (11th Cir. 2017)
(“[T]he implicit assumption of Rule 609 is that prior felony convictions have probative value.” 
(quoting United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 1998)); State v. Randall, 639 
N.W.2d 439, 444 (N.D. 2002) (stating that “inherent in Rule 609(a) is an acknowledgement that prior 
convictions are probative of a witness’s credibility,” without any limit on the type of convictions 
referred to); Commonwealth v. Daniels, No. 1286 EDA 2015, 2016 WL 5852208, at *8 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 9, 2016) (holding that witness’s convictions made her “less credible” than someone without 
convictions). 
6. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (Mass. 1884). 
7. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
8. See authorities cited supra note 4.
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of convictions.9 This article is an effort to study the assumption of 
relatively automatic prejudice that is implicit in Rule 609(a)(1)(B). 
To be specific, the past experiments have not been designed to 
differentiate well between the effects of alleged prejudice and those of 
lawful use of prior convictions. They show a generally higher rate of 
conviction, but not in a way that shows whether jurors are properly using 
the evidence to evaluate credibility or improperly responding to a 
suggestion of propensity.10 In fact, the two possible uses are difficult to 
separate because both uses make guilt more probable.11 One usage infers 
that the defendant is probably guilty because his tendency is to commit 
crimes and the other infers that he is guilty because he is telling a false 
story. Furthermore, if the background theory is accepted, the two are 
virtually impossible to separate because propensity becomes proper 
reasoning. The experiments described in the present article reflect an 
attempt to devise scenarios in which it is clear that the defendant’s 
testimony is not credible, the prior conviction therefore should have little 
effect on evaluations of credibility, and—under the usual assumptions— 
the propensity inference becomes the dominant influence of the 
conviction on outcomes.12 
Part I of the article considers the theory underlying the balancing test 
in the Rule. This review, for the most part, is familiar territory, although 
the article extends the usual analysis to describe unexpressed assumptions 
that may be necessary to support the balancing test in the Rule. Part II 
reports about an experiment that strongly suggests the possibility that the 
standard assumption of prejudice may be erroneous, particularly in cases 
9. The experiments have not been designed to differentiate between the effects of alleged
prejudice and those of proper use of prior convictions, as distinguished from the overall effects of 
prior convictions. See, e.g., Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on 
Juror Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 70–77 (1995) (reporting on a study involving 
105 “mock jurors,” and concluding that those who were informed of prior conviction were 
“significantly more likely to convict him of a subsequent offense than were jurors without this 
information,” but not separating alleged prejudice from proper use of convictions); Roselle L. Wissler 
& Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions When Jurors Use Prior Conviction 
Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 39–47 (1985) (reporting on experiment 
involving 160 mock jurors and concluding, although not in quantitative way, that “it appears that 
[they] used the prior conviction evidence to help them judge the likelihood that the defendant 
committed the crime charged . . . even though they had been instructed not to use the information for 
that purpose,” but this conclusion reflects what “appear[ed]” to the authors); see also HARRY 
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146–48 (LITTLE, BROWN & CO., 1966) (finding 
that conviction rates were twenty-seven percent higher when jurors knew of prior conviction 
evidence, but not separating allegedly prejudicial use from proper use). 
10. See authorities cited in supra note 4. 
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part II.
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in which the prosecution’s evidence is itself very persuasive. The 
experiment produced a statistically significant result in which a prior 
conviction, coupled with a limiting instruction, made mock jurors more 
prone to acquit than to convict: a counterintuitive outcome. Part III 
discloses the limits of the experiment, and it makes suggestions for further 
research. A final section contains the author’s conclusions, which include 
the suggestion that the main assumption underlying Rule 609, of 
prejudice, may be more doubtful than intuition might tell us. 
II. THE RULE LIMITING CONVICTIONS OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
Rule 609(a)(1)(B) is the most important part of the Rule governing
impeachment by conviction. It contains the principles that most often 
exclude conviction evidence. The judge is a gatekeeper charged with 
admitting the defendant’s convictions only if “the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to [the] defendant.”13 
This standard is loaded toward exclusion. It can be explained as the 
“reverse, altered Rule 403 balancing test.” Rule 403 admits all relevant 
evidence for which probative value is not “substantially outweighed” by 
prejudice or other counterweights.14 Thus, 403 is weighted in favor of 
admissibility.15 But for the criminal defendant’s prior convictions, Rule 
609 stands the 403 test on its head. It instead requires probative value to 
outweigh prejudice, although it alters this reversed 403 balance so that the 
probativity does not have to “substantially” outweigh prejudice for the 
evidence to be admitted. 
A. What Are the Factors That the Rule Balances? 
Thus, the Rule calls for the court to measure probative value. But 
what probative value is it measuring? The answer is that it is measuring 
the probative value of the conviction as impeachment of the defendant.16 
In other words, the objective is to determine how much the jury will 
devalue the testimony of the criminal defendant after learning that he has 
been convicted of a past crime.17 But there is more to it than this. The 
cases also measure the “need” for evidence that impeaches the defendant, 
13. FED. R. EVID. 609 (a)(1)(B). 
14. FED. R. EVID. 403.
15. See United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 247 (2d Cir. 2012). 
16. See authorities cited supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
17. See authorities cited supra note 5. See also Walden v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 523
(3d Cir. 1997). 
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a concept that is discussed further below.18 Impeachment effectiveness is 
added to the usefulness of impeachment to determine probative value.19 
The addition of two imprecise quantities produces an even more imprecise 
quantity. 
This imprecise quantity is then compared to the imprecise quantity 
of prejudice that the conviction creates for the defendant.20 Prejudice, in 
turn, is the implication of the conviction about the character of the 
defendant. To be more exact, prejudice is the possible inference of a 
propensity of the defendant to commit the crime on trial.21 This factor, 
then, requires consideration of the policy of the Rules to exclude 
propensity evidence—unless it is propensity of certain kinds, such as 
repeated methods of operation that show intent.22 Here, there is more 
imprecision. 
Beyond the problem of imprecision of measurement, the Rule does 
not tell us very well what we are measuring. Nor do the cases. The cases 
do not provide a clear view of which crimes carry the most probative value 
on impeachment.23 The assumption behind the rule is that all convictions, 
including those for crimes that do not feature truthfulness or honesty as 
elements, show that the defendant is less credible.24 Thus, crimes such as 
involuntary manslaughter or negligent homicide, or for that matter 
antitrust crimes or air pollution crimes, can qualify even though they do 
not contain credibility-related elements. The inference behind the Rule is 
that if you were to round up all living persons convicted of non-intent 
crimes like involuntary manslaughter, the people in that group would be 
less likely to tell the truth, and more likely to prevaricate, than the rest of 
the population. This assumption may strike the reader as plausible, or as 
unfounded. In any event, it is one of the largely unexamined assumptions 
underlying Rule 609. 
In fact, there is another theory of the impeachment value in prior 
convictions. In this view, the meaning of the prior conviction lies in 
18. E.g., United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 909 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Flowers, No. 3:14cr100/MCR, 2015 WL 13404113, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 3015). 
19. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (a)(1)(B). 
20. See Flowers, 2015 WL 13404113, at *2 (stating that courts “also” should consider the need 
for impeachment).  
21. See id. 
22. See generally United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (citing usual policy 
against other-crimes evidence but admitting it if properly offered for purpose other than propensity). 
23. See infra Part IB.
24. See authorities cited supra note 5. 
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showing the defendant’s “background.” This “background theory” is 
explained by Professors Greene, Nesson, and Murray:25 
Impeachment by prior crimes could alternatively be viewed as a 
practical counterbalance to the fifth amendment, allowing the 
prosecution minimal latitude in telling the factfinder about the 
background of a defendant who chooses to step out from behind the 
shield of the fifth amendment to assert his innocence. The defendant 
with a criminal record is thereby prevented from presenting himself to 
the jury as naively innocent. Many courts harbor this view of Rule 609. 
The logic of this approach would forswear the idea that the sole function 
of introducing prior convictions is to prove by the nature of the prior 
crime that the defendant has a dishonest character. The harsh truth is that 
all defendants have an extremely powerful incentive to tell a story 
consistent with their innocence. Instead, the function of impeachment 
by prior crimes could be conceived more broadly: to give the factfinder 
some background about the defendant to provide a framework in which 
to judge the plausibility of the defendant’s story of innocence. 
This “background theory” would seem to allow the jury to consider 
propensity toward crime, at least in deciding whether to credit the 
defendant’s testimony. If the defendant’s profession of innocence is 
viewed through the lens of a prior conviction, considering whether the 
testimony is plausible becomes an exercise in deciding how likely it is that 
he is guilty as a means of deciding whether he is telling the truth. But the 
instruction that usually is given to jurors contradicts this theory, or seems 
to.26 
B. Which Convictions Carry How Much Impeachment Value? 
Unfortunately, Rule 609(a)(1) does not tell us which convictions 
carry the most impeachment value. So, perhaps the weights of convictions 
can be inferred from the structure of the rest of the Rule. Rule 609(a)(2), 
sometimes called the “automatic admit,”27 tells us that a crime that 
includes “a dishonest act or false statement” must be admitted without any 
25. Eric Green, Charles Nesson & Petter Murray, Commentary: The Use of Prior Convictions, 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE, https://wiki.harvard.edu/
confluence/display/GNME/COMMENTARY%3A+THE+USE+OF+PRIOR+CONVICTIONS 
[https://perma.cc/99MG-2ZUH].  
26. See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text; see also Appendix B (excerpting a version
of the instruction). 
27. See State v. York, 427 P.3d 371, 375 (Utah 2018) (quoting authority stating that such a
conviction is to be “automatically” admitted).  
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balancing test.28 Perjury is an example, presumably, and so is a crime of 
evidence tampering that contains an element of dishonesty.29 
But Rule 609(a)(2) has a counterintuitive twist to it. The Rule applies 
only if the crime “requires proof of” a dishonest act or false statement.30 
Thus, shoplifting does not qualify.31 Theft may not qualify, perhaps, 
depending on the particular brand of theft committed.32 Robbery may not 
qualify, because robbery can be committed without any element that 
involves “an act of dishonesty or false statement.”33 If a person were to 
say, “of course robbery is a crime of dishonesty!”, the observation would 
be correct in common sense terms, but it is not always correct in the 
convoluted logic of Rule 609(b).34 Thus, the structure of Rule 609 does 
not provide a great deal of help in weighing the impeachment value of 
most crimes. 
The cases are not definitive either. It depends on the jurisdiction. 
There is some suggestion that crimes qualifying in the vernacular as 
dishonest have greater impeachment value that those that do not, but it is 
only a suggestion,35 and there is a suggestion that possession crimes have 
lower value,36 but the cases furnish little else that describes the 
comparative weights of probativity. There is no scale provided by the 
cases or the Rule by which to measure degrees of impeachment power. 
Survey results show that both judges and students regard theft-related 
28. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
29. See York, 427 P.3d at 375.
30. See id. 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that theft
convictions are not usually admissible under 609(a)(2) but may be if the definition of the particular 
kind of theft includes an element of dishonesty). 
32. See State v. Winegardner, 397 P.3d 363, 366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (“[S]hoplifting is not a 
dishonest act or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).”).  
33. See State v. Sims, 526 N.W.2d 201, 201 (Minn. 1994) (holding that robbery did not
“directly involve dishonesty or false statement.”). But see infra note 34 (citing contrary cases). 
34. See State v. Al-Amin, 578 S.E.2d 32, 34, 37 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that majority of 
jurisdictions admit robbery convictions under 609(a)(2)), overruled by State v. Broadnax, 779 S.E.2d 
789, 792 (S.C. 2015) (holding that a robbery conviction “is not probative of untruthfulness.”).  
35. For example, some courts say that burglary and larceny are crimes that reflect on
credibility, but they do not expressly rank them as having high impeachment value in comparison to 
other crimes. See United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hatcher, 
496 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1974); cf. United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1272 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that theft-related convictions have “some bearing on credibility.”). 
36. E.g., State v. Roche, 878 P.2d 497, 500 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that impeachment 
value of defendant’s possession convictions was a “close question,” mentioning a defendant’s 
argument that their convictions “simply do not reflect on his dishonesty,” and criticizing state’s 
argument). 
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convictions as likely to qualify for admission into evidence, but there is 
no codified or decisional basis for this tendency.37 
Some cases contain lists of factors to consider in assessing 
impeachment value, but they do not rank types of convictions. For 
example, Washington’s Alexis38 factors must be applied whenever a court 
in that state weighs probative value and prejudice: 
Those factors are: (1) the length of the defendant’s criminal record, (2) 
the remoteness of the prior convictions, (3) the nature of the prior 
crimes, (4) the centrality of the credibility issue, and (5) the 
impeachment value of the prior crimes.39 
Another jurisdiction’s similar list appears in Hankins v. State.40 These 
authorities tell us that the “nature” of the witness’s crimes and their 
“impeachment value” are to be weighed, but they do not hint at how to 
assign the controlling “weights.” 
C. The Need for Impeachment and the Need for the Defendant’s Story 
Into this mix of uncertainty, the courts have sometimes inserted two 
other considerations. As indicated above, some courts have referred to the 
need for the prosecution to use impeachment material.41 Others have 
asserted that there is a need for the jury to hear the defendant’s story. 
Neither of these factors is expressed directly in the Rule. Perhaps it can 
be argued that they are implicitly included in the balancing factors that the 
Rule does set out: by the inference that impeachment value depends on 
the need for impeachment and prejudice is to be measured by the value of 
the evidence that it denigrates, although these do not seem to be the most 
natural conclusions from the text of the Rule.42 As one judge put it, “There 
may be cases where it would be of greater importance that the jury hear a 
defendant’s story than that the defendant forego testifying because of the 
fear of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction.”43 
37. Ric Simmons, An Empirical Study of Rule 609 and Suggestions for Practical Reform, 59
B.C. L. REV. 993, 1020–24 (2018). This study was a survey and did not consider the effects of 
convictions on jury decisions. 
38. State v. Alexis, 621 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Wash. 1980). 
39. State v. Roche, 878 P.2d 497, 500 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (citing factors).
40. Hankins v. State, 180 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005), citing Hernandez v. State,
976 S.W.2d 753, 755–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 
41. FED. R. EVID. 609 (a)(1)(B); see also cases cited supra note 18.
42. FED. R. EVID. 609 (a)(1)(B) itself refers to the probative value “of the evidence” and to “its 
prejudicial effect,” not to the otherwise credible or non-credible nature of the defendant’s story as a 
whole. 
43. Evans v. United States, 397 F.2d 675, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). 
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In any event, the need for impeachment and the value of hearing the 
defendant’s story are mentioned in some of the cases. But how is one to 
evaluate these factors for balancing purposes? It might seem that the need 
for impeaching material is at its greatest when the prosecution’s evidence 
is potentially doubtful. But that conclusion would insert material thought 
to be harmful to the defendant precisely when the defendant’s case is most 
appealing. On the other hand, it might be argued that the need for 
impeaching evidence is at its highest when the prosecution’s case is 
strongest, because then the possibility of a miscarriage of justice from a 
false defense is most serious. 
As for the assertion that the jury needs to hear the defendant’s story, 
there are even greater difficulties in finding a scale by which to weigh this 
factor. One problem is that there is a frequently unanswerable question: 
just what is the defendant’s story? The Fifth Amendment relieves the 
defendant of the duty to inform the court, except in some specific 
circumstances, such as those involving alibi or insanity.44 In instances in 
which the court knows or suspects what the defense is, this factor seems 
to put the court in an awkward position, one that judges usually should 
avoid, because it seems to require the court to weigh the value of the 
defendant’s exonerating testimony before hearing it or allowing the jury 
to hear it. 
D. Estimating the Degree of Prejudice Created by the Conviction 
Then, there is the matter of weighing prejudice. The potential 
prejudice comes from two sources created by evidence of a criminal 
conviction: the “bad individual”45 inference and the “propensity”46 
inference. If the crime on trial is theft and the conviction offered for 
impeachment is involuntary manslaughter, there is probably not much 
suggestion in the conviction of propensity to commit theft, but the 
conviction does show that the defendant has been a bad individual in the 
past. The factfinder might devalue the defendant’s right to proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. But this inference, even if prejudicial, seems to be built 
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a) (requiring notice of alibi); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (notice of
insanity). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 879 F.3d 900, 926 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States 
v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 944, (9th Cir. 2007)) (stating that Rule 404 “curtails . . . ‘bad man’ 
evidence.”). But almost any evidence used to prove a crime will support this inference. 
46. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) usually excludes conduct used to prove “action in conformity,” or in 
other words, propensity. 
9
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into the Rule as an acceptable influence because it is the basis of the 
impeachment itself.47 
But if the crime on trial is theft and the conviction is also for theft, 
inferences from the impeachment may include not only that the defendant 
has been a bad individual, but also that he has been, and possibly still is, 
a thief. Thus, in United States v. Brown,48 the court said that the danger of 
unfair prejudice is particularly present where the prior conviction 
“involves precisely the same activity as the [present offense].” This 
propensity inference contravenes the principle in Rule 404(b) that 
evidence about character usually may not support a conclusion about 
action in conformity.49 There are exceptions in which evidence used for 
propensity is allowed, but the policy of the Rules generally disfavors the 
propensity inference. 
There is reason to criticize the anti-propensity principle,50 but for 
better or worse, it is deeply ingrained in the Rules.51 It seems likely that 
an intelligent layperson would consider the result exactly backward 
because the anti-propensity principle means that the more similar the 
impeaching conviction is to the crime on trial, the more likely it is that the 
theory of the Rule requires excluding the conviction.52 Thus, the logic 
says that if a defendant testifies to an alibi in a robbery case, his earlier 
conviction for robbery will be less likely to be allowed to impeach him—
but his conviction for murder will more likely be admitted.53 It should 
immediately be added that reality does not always follow this pattern. A 
judge may exercise discretion to admit a robbery conviction against a 
robbery defendant, possibly by recognizing a need for impeachment.54 In 
fact, one study shows that judges are “much more likely” than students to 
47. The inference is that the defendant is a bad person, and therefore conviction of any kind of 
crime bears on credibility. See cases cited supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
48. United States v. Brown, 606 F. Supp. 2d 306, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Joe, No. 07 Cr. 734, 2008 WL 2810169, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2008)). 
49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
50. For example, FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (allowing character evidence offered by the
defendant) is an exception, and so is FED. R. EVID. 413 (allowing similar crimes in sexual assault 
cases). 
51. See David Crump, The Case for Selective Abolition of the Rules of Evidence, 35 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 585, 625–33 (2006) (offering arguments for admitting propensity evidence). 
52. See David Crump, An Edifice of Misshapen Stones: Interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(a), 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 681–82 (2015). 
53. See supra notes 42, 48 and accompanying text.
54. The Government’s need for impeaching evidence is a factor in favor of admissibility. See 
supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.  
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consider convictions admissible for impeachment.55 But the theory of the 
rule suggests that similarity of the two crimes is prejudice. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF PREDUDICE
Given the uncertainties underlying the determinants in Rule 609, it 
is surprising that there has not been more statistical evaluation of the 
existence or weight of prejudice that an impeaching conviction can create. 
The author of this article conducted a pair of experiments56 that were 
intended to find out about this question with a scenario aimed at isolating 
the alleged prejudice. 
A. The Experiment: Two Pairs of Scenarios, Illustrated by Appendices 
A and B to This Article 
(1)The First Pair of Scenarios. A group of 61 first-year law students 
taking a course in criminal law took part in the first stage of the 
experiment. As is usual for first-year students, these experimental subjects 
had had no formal exposure to the Rules of Evidence.57 They were divided 
into two groups and given two closely similar scenarios. Both scenarios 
depicted a robbery of a clerk in a convenience store. A police officer 
responded quickly and promptly apprehended the suspect, who matched 
the clerk’s description, a few blocks away after he ran upon seeing the 
officer’s vehicle. The clerk had told the officer that the defendant had 
taken $45, with a faded, yellowed $5 bill on top. During a search incident 
to arrest, the officer found $45 in the suspect’s front pocket, with a faded, 
yellowed $5 bill on top, and he also found a pistol as described.58 In 
summary, the identification was unshaken, and the corroboration was very 
strong. 
Also, according to both scenarios, the defense lawyer cross-
examined both the clerk and the officer with best efforts, to little effect.59 
The defendant testified in his defense, saying that he had earned the $45 
by washing dishes and that he was walking to his aunt’s home. He was 
cross-examined, and the cross-examination revealed that his aunt’s home 
55. Ric Simmons, supra note 37, at 1024–25 (reporting on survey of judges and students). 
56. Experiment conducted during course in Criminal Law, Spring Semester, 2018, University 
of Houston Law Center. 
57. At this law school (University of Houston Law Center), and customarily in others,
Evidence is not a first-year subject, and the Criminal Law course does not cover it. 
58. See infra Appendices A and B.
59. See infra Appendix A. This feature of the scenario was included to increase effects of the
conviction evidence and to decrease other effects. 
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was nowhere near the direction he was walking.60 Both scenarios 
repeatedly told the readers that conviction could result only upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.61 
But there was a difference in the two scenarios. The first scenario 
ended with this set of facts, in a more extended version. The second 
scenario, however, also included the introduction into evidence of the 
defendant’s prior conviction for theft.62 This scenario also included a 
version of a pattern instruction telling the readers that they could consider 
the conviction only in assessing the credibility of the defendant and not in 
deciding whether he had committed the crime of which he was accused.63 
The individuals in both groups were instructed to state, by checking 
a box, whether they would probably find the defendant guilty or not guilty 
if they encountered this case in court. Participants were asked to set aside 
the fact that the scenario was hypothetical and to do their best to decide 
what they would actually do as jurors.64 
The first pair of scenarios, and the questions and instructions 
accompanying them, are set out as Appendices A and B to this article. 
(2) The Second Pair of Scenarios: The Same, but with the Same 
Crime of Robbery. The second pair of scenarios was identical to the first, 
except that the crime of prior conviction was identified as robbery—the 
same crime as the crime on trial. The two scenarios used in this second 
part of the experiment are not attached, because the only difference from 
the first set was the substitution of the word “robbery” as the crime of 
prior conviction. 
(3) A Brief Summary of the Result. Contrary to expectation, neither 
pair of scenarios produced any greater tendency toward a finding of guilty 
from the prior conviction. The first pair of scenarios resulted in more 
convictions without the prior conviction than with it. In this instance, the 
numbers were not statistically significant. The second pair of scenarios 
again resulted in more findings of guilty without the prior conviction than 
with it, but this time, the result was statistically significant. In other words, 
the results are counterintuitive. Including a prior conviction, together with 
a limiting instruction, prompted more mock jurors to acquit, rather than 
to convict. 
60. See infra Appendices A and B. 
61. In addition, participants were especially acquainted with the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt because their casebook included a complete chapter dedicated to the subject. DAVID 
CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES Ch. 4 (3d ed. 
2012). 
62. See infra Appendix B. 
63. Id. 
64. See infra Appendices A and B. 
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B. The Hypothesis Formed before the Experiment—and the 
Experimental Design 
The author hypothesized, on the basis of the well-known suspicion 
of prejudice embedded in Rule 609,65 that there would be significantly 
more findings of guilty in response to the second scenario of each pair: 
the one with the prior conviction. The “bad individual” inference was 
there, if it exists.66 As for the propensity inference, the conviction in the 
first pair of scenarios was not squarely the same as the crime on trial, but 
similar enough to give rise to the suggestion that this defendant was prone 
to the kind of crime for which he was accused.67 The second scenario 
strengthened this inference by using the same crime as the one on trial. It 
was expected that the existence of prejudice underlying the Rule would 
be inferable from the results. 
The experimental scenarios were designed to heighten the effect of 
the conviction. An effort was made to create a crime that sounded simple, 
typical, and believable. At the same time, the effort was to produce 
scenarios with strong evidence of guilt, consistent with brevity.68 And the 
effort was to have the defendant testify, and the defense lawyer examine 
and cross-examine witnesses completely, although the evidence was 
unfavorable to the defendant throughout.69 It was hoped that these 
conditions would produce distributions of responses that would lead to a 
statistically significant result,70 in which the second scenarios in each pair 
would produce more convictions, consistently with the inference of 
prejudice. 
It should be added that if the “background theory” of impeachment 
by conviction is accepted as a part of the rationale for Rule 609, the idea 
of prejudice is so difficult to define that it probably cannot be detected by 
experiment.71 Since Professors Greene, Nesson, and Murray state that 
“many courts” accept this theory,72 it can be argued that none of the 
studies, including this one, can really detect any prejudice. The analysis 
reported here, however, is an effort to detect prejudice in the form of 
propensity use of conviction evidence. 
65. See Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (Mass. 1884). 
66. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2009) (defining robbery as conduct
committed during a theft). 
68. This feature was included to enhance the effect of the prior conviction by minimizing other 
issues.  
69. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
71. See Green, supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
72. See id. 
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C. The Previous Experiments 
Previous experiments or works are exemplified by those cited above, 
including those by Greene and Dodge, Wissler and Saks, and Kalven and 
Zeisel.73 Although all are credible and valuable, none of these studies was 
designed so that they could separate and evaluate the effects of alleged 
prejudice, if indeed that ever can be done. Greene and Dodge, for 
example, manipulated information about prior acquittals, prior 
convictions, and instructions to disregard.74 They found that subjects who 
were told that the defendant had a prior conviction were significantly 
more likely to find him guilty than subjects without this information and 
that limiting instructions had limited effect.75 This result is interesting, but 
not because of a demonstration of prejudice. The findings simply are 
consistent with the conclusion that mock jurors responded to the prior 
conviction by disbelieving the defendant’s version of events, or in other 
words, by using the conviction properly under either the diminished 
credibility or background approaches. 
Kalven and Zeisel’s work is a landmark, but it does not address the 
point at issue. Their method included studies of actual juries’ results, and 
not of controlled comparisons. Their finding was that prior convictions 
increased the likelihood of a finding of guilt.76 But this result, again, is 
consistent with a conclusion that jurors simply discounted previously 
convicted defendants’ versions of events. 
Wissler & Saks’s work is more closely on point. Using an approach 
roughly similar to that of Greene and Dodge, these researchers concluded 
that mock jurors could not follow limiting instructions telling them to use 
prior convictions solely to evaluate credibility.77 As a result, Wissler & 
Saks concluded that it “appear[ed]” that the experimental subjects were 
responding to an inference that the accused was of bad character.78 But 
the problem with this inference is first, that it is an inference and not a 
direct result of the experiment, and second, that the inference of lessened 
credibility is supposed to work that way. The prior conviction, as Justice 
73. See authorities cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
74. Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision
Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 70–77 (1995). 
75. Id. 
76. HARRY KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146–48 (1966). 
77. Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 39–47 (1985). 
78. Id. 
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Holmes said, is supposed to show a “general readiness to do evil,” from 
which the jury can “infer a readiness to lie in a particular case.”79 
It should be added that the finding that jurors cannot follow this kind 
of limiting instruction is not a great discovery. The instruction is logically 
inconsistent and impossible to follow if taken literally. It typically tells 
jurors not to consider the prior conviction in assessing guilt but to consider 
it in evaluating the defendant’s exonerating testimony. If the conviction is 
used to diminish the defendant’s credibility and therefore his story, it is 
used to determine guilt, so the proper use of the evidence is also (or 
appears to be) an improper use. Granted, there is a way to see the two uses 
as different, but it requires really close reasoning, or as the poet said, the 
ability to know the dancer from the dance.80 
D. How This Experiment Is Different 
The experiment reported here reflects important differences from 
others that have been done. The design features a prosecution that is 
supported by convincing evidence. In contrast, the defendant’s testimony 
is not credible at all. The impeaching conviction is close to but not 
identical to the crime on trial in one scenario, and it is identical in the 
other. 
Why were these features chosen? The experiment is designed to 
maximize the potential effect of the propensity inference: the conclusion 
that because the defendant has committed and been convicted of a similar 
crime before this event, he is more likely to be guilty of this crime. This 
result, it was thought, would decrease the impact of the prior conviction 
for purposes of credibility and increase its potential use to support a 
propensity inference. 
In other words, these experimental conditions were thought to make 
the prohibited jury usage of the prior convictions—as an inference of 
propensity—more readily recognizable, if it existed. 
E. The Result of the Experiment 
The result was not consistent with the hypothesis at all. 
79. See Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (Mass. 1884). 
80. W.B. YEATS, Among School Children, in THE POEMS OF W.B. YEATS: A NEW EDITION 
(Richard J. Finneran ed., Macmillan Pub. Co.) (1989). “O body swayed to music, O brightening 
glance, / How can we know the dancer from the dance?” are the last two lines of this poem. A 
superficial reading would translate this passage by saying that that we cannot visualize the thing 
separately from the evidence of the thing. 
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(1) The First Pair of Scenarios. The first group in this pair, the one 
without the conviction, might be called the control group,81 and the second 
the experimental group. In response to the first pair of scenarios, without 
the conviction, 25 subjects out of a 32-person population gave responses 
of Guilty. With the conviction, 20 out of 29 answered guilty.82 This meant 
that 69% in the experimental group opted for guilty, versus 78% in the 
control group. In summary, the second scenario, which included the 
defendant’s prior conviction, was less likely, not more likely, to receive 
answers of guilty from these particular experimental subjects. 
The experiment suggested—but only suggested83—that the inference 
of prejudice underlying Rule 609(a)(1)(B) may be mistaken. At the least, 
it suggests that prejudice is not terribly significant, in a case with 
circumstances like the scenarios. But the data, in this first phase of the 
experiment, were not robust enough for statistical significance. 
(2) The Second Pair of Scenarios. The second pair of scenarios, 
with the prior conviction the same as the crime on trial, produced another 
surprise, and this time a statistically significant correlation. In the first 
group, 26 responded with guilty, 3 with not guilty. In the second group, 
with the prior conviction, 17 said guilty; 9 said not guilty. This result was 
statistically significant, as will be explained below. But it is certainly in 
contradiction to the expected outcome. 
(3) Why did these results occur? The experimental subjects were 
debriefed about their reasons. The most cogent explanation for a 
difference in the two groups was that the instruction about how not to use 
the conviction84 was confusing and internally contradictory.85 This report 
from the subjects was not surprising. As is indicated above, telling 
decisionmakers to use the conviction to evaluate the credibility of the 
defendant’s testimony, and at the same time telling them not to use it to 
decide the case, is to demand the impossible. In addition, the subjects 
offered the rationale that readers of the second scenario might have 
inferred from the prior conviction that the defendant faced a very long 
81. Use of a control group reduces the effects of confounding variables and increases the
likelihood that differences actually reflect the independent variable of interest. See DAVID CRUMP, 
HOW TO REASON: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY THINKER’S TOOL KIT 450 (Quid Pro Books, 2d ed. 2014) 
[hereinafter “HOW TO REASON”]. 
82. Copies of responses are held by the author. 
83. Mere suggestion is all, because the result lacks statistical significance. See infra Part IIIA.
84. See infra Appendix B. 
85. Unless the reader of the instruction has taken an Evidence course, it probably seems
contradictory. On one hand, the instruction tells the reader not to use the conviction to decide the 
defendant’s guilt, but on the other hand, it tells the reader to go right ahead in using it to decide his 
guilt, by using it to reject his defense. 
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prison sentence and may have withheld a finding of guilt as a cautionary 
measure. 
The rest of the responses did not explain the result. The subjects 
pointed out, for example, that reading a scenario is less compelling than 
seeing testimony under oath from a flesh-and-blood victim or from a real 
defendant who faces imprisonment. But this and other explanations apply 
equally to the responses of both groups. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF THE EXPERIMENT AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH 
A. The Meaning of the Experiment 
(1) The First Pair of Scenarios: Counterintuitive, but Not 
Statistically Significant. The result produced by the first pair of scenarios 
is not statistically significant.86 The p-value as calculated by 
Mathematica87 is 0.561524. There is a greater than 50% probability that 
distributions this strong or stronger in support of the null hypothesis 
would result from randomness.88 A statistician usually would not accept 
results with a p-value greater than a pre-set alpha value of 0.05.89 
Doesn’t the result, then, support the null hypothesis: that the 
conviction does not create a greater likelihood of a guilty response? It may 
suggest this conclusion, but not in a statistically significant way. A failure 
to reject the null hypothesis is not equivalent to statistical support for the 
null hypothesis.90 In other words, the first pair of scenarios does not prove 
statistically either that a conviction in these circumstances is prejudicial 
or that it is not. 
(2) The Second Pair of Scenarios: Counterintuitive AND 
Statistically Significant(!) The second pair of scenarios again produced 
86. See HOW TO REASON, supra note 81, at 425 (explaining that statistical significance results 
from a low p-value, meaning that there is a low probability of an equally strong or stronger distribution 
at random). 
87. Wolfram Mathematica is a web-based system for technical computation. See WOLFRAM 
MATHEMATICA, https://www.wolfram.com/mathematica [https://perma.cc/3B9G-SWWA]. The 
second group was evaluated with the Fisher Exact test. 
88. The p-value is the probability that an equally strong or stronger distribution would result
at random. See HOW TO REASON, supra note 81, at 425. 
89. See id. The “alpha value” is a somewhat arbitrary pre-set level above which we will not
accept a higher p-value. 
90. The null hypothesis is the conjecture that there is no correlation. But the failure to detect a 
correlation does not prove that one is not there. The “power” of a data set is its likelihood of rejecting 
the null hypothesis and evidencing a sufficiently significant correlation. See HOW TO REASON, supra 
note 81, at 427. With greater power, we might see statistically significant evidence of a correlation. 
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a counterintuitive result, but this time, the numbers were statistically 
significant. This part of the experiment, then, shows that giving the prior 
conviction and instruction to jurors makes them more acquittal prone. The 
p-value here is 0.0484776, below the pre-set alpha value of 0.5. This result 
may be reflective only of cases in which the evidence of guilt is strong, 
and it may be valid only if the mock jurors are particularly likely to read 
and follow the court’s instructions. In any event, it certainly is surprising. 
(3) Are the Experimental Conditions Acceptable? One limitation 
of the experiment is that the respondents were not placed in the positions 
of real jurors. A real jury would see the robbery victim and experience 
through her the horror of having a gun pointed at one’s head. They would 
see and hear Officer Bob Brown, who performed admirable police work. 
And, of course, they would see and hear the accused: the defendant. It can 
immediately be added that any experiment of this kind is likely to exhibit 
these limitations, because it would be difficult to produce a completely 
realistic set of conditions in an ethical experiment. The study would have 
to be based upon manipulation of a real trial of a real defendant, and there 
are ethical and practical reasons why that cannot be done. 
A further difficulty with the experiment is that it involves small 
populations. Statisticians are skeptical of the result of any survey 
including only a small population.91 This factor means that the power of 
the study—the likelihood of it demonstrating a correlation if one exists—
is relatively low,92 although the second scenario did detect a correlation: 
a surprising one. 
Furthermore, the participants were a convenience sample.93 The 
experimental subjects do not correspond exactly to the ideal population, 
which would be jurors. A law student population is likely to be different 
from a population of jurors. The average age is much less than that of 
jurors, and the subjects have self-selected for fondness for the law. One 
might also hazard the guess that this population is more acquittal-prone 
than a group of real jurors might be. 
The scenarios in the experiment were constructed with a particular 
kind of case in mind. The prosecution’s evidence was strong, the 
defendant’s evidence weak, and the impeaching conviction was likely to 
be perceived as showing dishonesty.94 In a different kind of case—with a 
91. See HOW TO REASON, supra note 81, at 427 (explaining effect of sample size); HOW TO
REASON, supra note 81, at 424–45 (demonstrating with examples). 
92. See HOW TO REASON, supra note 81, at 427. 
93. See id. at 448–49 (explaining the sampling frame and convenience samples).
94. These attributes were chosen in an effort to minimize the effects of confounding variables. 
See infra Appendices A and B. 
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more credible defense, a less persuasive prosecution, and a conviction 
unrelated to dishonesty—the experiment might produce different 
distributions. 
On the other hand, most of these defects are not fatal to the value of 
the experiment. Sometimes convenience samples are perfectly 
acceptable.95 One sometimes sees a survey-taker at the mall, stopping 
passers-by; and the assumption is that the result can be useful even though 
the sample is artificial and even though non-response bias will be 
significant.96 Psychology departments often use students, who sometimes 
are gathered by quasi-coercive means such as course requirements.97 The 
comparison of a control group with an experimental group also supports 
the value of this kind of experiment.98 The sample size would weaken99 
but not invalidate the experiment if it produced significant results.100 The 
orientation of the scenarios, with strong prosecution, weak defense, and 
persuasive impeachment, was constructed precisely to produce a result 
showing prejudice if it existed.101 
B. Incidental Results 
One interesting aspect of the experiment is the incidental 
demonstration of limited probabilistic reasoning by the survey 
participants. Evidence consisting of credible testimony of an eyewitness 
coupled with significant corroborating circumstances is strong evidence. 
The scenarios here, with a solid live witness and corroborating evidence 
including the $45 in the defendant’s possession, the faded yellow $5 bill, 
the black pistol on his person, the defendant’s close proximity, and his 
95. See HOW TO REASON, supra note 81, at 448. 
96. See id. 
97. One of the best-known experiments in social psychology is Zimbardo’s “prison 
experiment,” which used students designated as “prisoners” and “guards,” and which produced so 
much mistreatment of the prisoner–students that the experiment had to be prematurely terminated. 
See David Crump, The Social Psychology of Evil: Can the Law Prevent Groups from Making Good 
People Go Bad?, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1441, 1446–47 (2008) (citing PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER 
EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 174–94 (2007)). 
98. See authorities cited supra note 81. 
99. See HOW TO REASON, supra note 81, at 427 (explaining effect of sample size); HOW TO
REASON, supra note 81, at 424–45 (demonstrating with examples). 
 100.  Smaller data sets can lead to significant results. See HOW TO REASON, supra note 81, at 
427–29 (showing an example in which increasing a population from five to ten, which is a data set 
much smaller than the experiment here, produced statistically significant results).  
101.  See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
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evidently false exonerating story, provided significant proof of guilt.102 
But many participants did not perceive the case this way. 
Bayes’ Theorem provides a way of calculating a revised probability 
when new evidence is added to an antecedent probability.103 The Theorem 
is useful in updating a subjectively generated likelihood with another 
piece of information that is more precise, such as an evaluation of an 
eyewitness identification combined with corroborating evidence. Its 
mathematics are set out in an Appendix to this article, Appendix C. Bayes’ 
Theorem produces a high level of probability, very near certainty, for the 
scenarios used in the experiment.104 Even if one assumes relatively low 
reliability in the identification of the defendant by the store clerk, and even 
if one assigns a relatively conservative estimate to the likelihood of 
finding exactly $45 on a random person with a faded $5 bill on top, Bayes’ 
Theorem compels a result that approaches certainty.105 
Many of the experimental subjects did not seem to understand this 
concept. Debriefing of the population gave rise to several comments that 
showed doubt based upon even a relatively small possibility of error in 
the clerk’s identification. One participant actually wrote on his response 
that “[i]t depend[ed]” on whether he believed the eyewitness, evidently 
indicating that he did not appreciate the significance of the 
corroboration.106 This reasoning showed little grasp of the principle 
underlying Bayes’ Theorem. Even a shaky identification is strengthened 
to near certainty by the kind of corroboration present here. But the genius 
of the jury, in real life, probably would ensure an understanding of the 
point, because members would almost certainly alert other members to the 
rarity of the corroboration.107 
C. Further Research 
A new experiment could productively be done with the same two 
scenarios involved here, but with more participants. One could hope, then, 
 102.  One can hypothesize conditions under which the evidence is not so strong, such as by 
introducing a suspicion that the robbery victim and the officer have conspired to concoct false 
testimony describing $45 in bills and a faded $5 bill when neither existed. This kind of suspicion 
seems far-fetched, however, in this scenario. 
103.  See infra Appendix C. 
104.  See infra Appendix C. 
105.  See infra Appendix C. 
106.  See supra note 62 (author retains responses). 
107.  This is not to say that jurors would be likely to understand the mathematics of Bayes’ 
Theorem set out in Appendix C. See infra Appendix C. Instead, lay people have an intuitive sense 
that rare corroboration greatly increases confidence. Some members of the experimental population 
may have missed this point and did not have others to explain it.  
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to produce more robust data and an experiment with more power.108 Such 
an experiment could, perhaps, provide a statistically significant 
demonstration that the use of a criminal conviction to impeach does 
produce a higher incidence of convictions even when impeachment is not 
needed, owing to the strength of the prosecution’s case and the apparent 
falsity of the defendant’s story. This result would provide support to the 
hypothesis that the conviction induces at least some inference of 
propensity and therefore—under the logic of the Rules—some amount of 
prejudice.109 Or the experiment might produce significant results 
supporting the null hypothesis: that the conviction does not produce 
prejudice under these conditions.110 
Furthermore, the experiment could productively be varied. Subjects 
might be given scenarios with even greater strength in the prosecution’s 
case. For example, the arrest might be staged immediately outside the 
door of the store. The corroborating evidence might be made more 
compelling. The perpetrator might be described as having escaped with 
not only $45 with a faded $5 bill on top, but also with a gold necklace 
taken from the clerk with her name on it.111 The potential propensity 
inference might be strengthened, as by amending the second scenario to 
include a prosecution for aggravated (not simple) robbery and a prior 
aggravated robbery conviction used to impeach.112 
It would also be productive to try to tease out differences in the force 
of different kinds of past convictions. One might imagine a prosecution 
for a crime that is not so serious or dishonest as robbery—say, a 
prosecution for driving while intoxicated—and the use of one scenario in 
which the accused is impeached with a conviction for theft and another in 
which the conviction is for assault.113 
All of these experiments could be conducted by anyone who has 
access to a group of potential survey subjects. The effort would begin with 
amendment of the scenarios provided with this article or even the re-use 
of these scenarios with a larger audience. The results can readily be 
108.  See authorities cited supra notes 66–80 and accompanying text. 
 109.  This was the experimental hypothesis. See Simmons, supra note 55 and accompanying 
text. 
110.  This was the result that the experiment actually suggested. 
111.  The corroborating evidence would have much greater force than that in the experiment 
here. 
 112.  Similarity in the convictions is said to increase the prejudice. But does it? We have only 
the unexplained inference. See supra Part ID. 
 113.  This experiment would tell us whether one type of crime has more impeachment value than 
another. See supra Part IB (explaining lack of clear authority on this point). 
21
Crump: Impeachment by Conviction
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
22 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:1 
tabulated, and available software on the internet will produce the 
statistical measurements.114 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rule 609(a)(1)(B) is the most important part of the Rule governing 
impeachment by criminal conviction. It imposes a significant 
qualification on the use of this device to test credibility when a criminal 
defendant undertakes to tell an exonerating story. The Rule is based on 
several assumptions, which are intuitively appealing but largely 
unexamined by empirical method. The issue arises frequently, has an 
important effect in the outcomes of criminal trials, and ought to be the 
subject of research. 
The most important assumption underlying the Rule is that 
impeachment by criminal conviction can raise a propensity inference.115 
This assumption suggests that the defendant is disposed to criminal 
activity, or so the argument goes. This suggestion, in turn, leads to the 
inference that impeachment by conviction is potentially prejudicial, at 
least according to the logic of the Rules.116 
The experiment described in this article suggests that the assumption 
about prejudice is overvalued, and it does so in a statistically significant 
way.117 The experimental populations were relatively small118—it is 
difficult to amass populations of significant size for such an effort—and 
there remains the possibility that an experiment with more data could 
show a contrary result.119 More experimentation would be desirable, and 
this article describes the patterns that it might follow. Meanwhile, the 
experiment is valuable because it shows that the assumption underlying 
the Rule is subject to greater doubt than intuition might tell us.120 
APPENDIX A 
FIRST SCENARIO USED IN EXPERIMENT 
AT THE END OF THIS DESCRIPTION, YOU WILL BE 
ASKED THIS QUESTION: “WOULD YOU SAY THAT THIS 
114.  See supra note 87 (citing Mathematica Software). 
115.  See supra Part ID. 
116.  See supra Part ID. 
117.  It does so by failing to demonstrate any of the prejudice under the conditions of the 
scenario. 
 118.  This aspect of the experiment means that it did not have power to show a correlation either 
way. See supra Part IIIA. 
119.  See supra Part IIIA. 
120.  It suggests this conclusion, although not in a statistically significant way. 
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DEFENDANT IS GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, 
OR NOT GUILTY?” 
The Defendant, whose name is Dee Fendant, has been on trial for 
robbery. The first witness was Courtney Cline, who testified to having 
been an attendant on duty at the Go-N-Tote on Antoine Drive in this city 
and county on the date stated in the indictment. Dee came in and walked 
slowly to the back of the store where refrigerated items are kept. Courtney 
watched carefully because Dee was looking all around. Courtney testified 
that Dee lingered in the back, within Courtney’s view, until a time when 
all customers were out of the store. Dee then hurried to the checkout 
counter, pulled out a black pistol, and demanded money. “This is a 
robbery. Give me everything in that cash register.” Courtney immediately 
complied, handing over the full contents of the cash register, while 
looking carefully at Dee, who grabbed the money and ran away toward 
the west. When asked whether that person who demanded and took the 
money was present, Courtney pointed out Dee. “Are you certain?” “Yes.” 
Courtney immediately called the police, and an officer, whom Courtney 
now knows as Officer Bob Brown, arrived “almost immediately” and took 
off in his vehicle to the west. Dee told Officer Brown that the robber had 
taken forty-five dollars, and that a faded, yellowish five-dollar bill was on 
top. No one else saw the robber. 
Courtney was cross-examined, of course, by Dee’s defense lawyer. 
“How good do you feel about identifying a person of different race, like 
Dee?” “I know that cross-racial identifications are sometimes difficult, but 
Dee has a distinctive face with a crooked nose.” “Weren’t you scared and 
looking mostly at the gun?” “Yes, I was scared, but I got a good look at 
him, and he’s very recognizable.” And there were other questions, but this 
is a sample. The cross-examination did not lessen Courtney’s credibility. 
Officer Bob Brown testified that he received a call about a robbery 
at the Go-N-Tote on Antoine and was close nearby. He got there quickly 
and briefly asked the attendant, whom he identified as Courtney Cline, 
what had happened, what was taken, what the robber looked like, and 
which way the robber was going. He got into his vehicle and took off to 
the west. He saw an individual who generally fit Courtney’s description 
of the robber. He stopped and told the individual to “Freeze.” The 
individual took off running, but within a block, Officer Brown was able 
to make an apprehension. Asked whether he saw the individual in the 
courtroom, Officer Brown said yes and identified Dee. Immediately after 
securing his arrestee, Officer Brown conducted a search incident to arrest, 
and he found a wad of bills in Dee’s right front pocket. The bills are in an 
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evidence bag, which is put into evidence. They total forty-five dollars, and 
there is a faded, yellowish five-dollar bill on top, just as Courtney said 
was taken. Dee’s other front pocket contained a small black Umarex 
pistol, just as Courtney said, and the pistol is placed in evidence. 
Again, there was cross-examination. “Did Dee have any other money 
on his person?” “Yes, a wallet in his back pocket with six dollars in it.” 
“Did you ask where Dee was going?” “Dee said, I was heading to my 
auntie’s home.” And there were other questions, but this is a sample. 
After the state rested its case, Dee Fendant took the witness stand and 
testified that someone else must have committed this crime, if anyone; 
Dee had no idea who did it. Dee does have an auntie. And Dee testified 
that that was where Dee was going. 
On cross examination, Dee admitted that actually, the auntie doesn’t 
live anywhere near where he was headed. “Why’d you run from the 
police?” “I’m not sure. I was scared of going to jail.” “Where do you claim 
you got the money?” “Washing dishes in the neighborhood.” Again, there 
were more questions, but this is a representative sample. 
You may assume that all required elements in this case are covered 
by sufficient evidence, all corresponding to the indictment, and the only 
question is the identification of Dee as the robber. 
The judge gives instructions to the jury, of which you are a member. 
These include an instruction that the defendant must be acquitted unless 
guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, the jury is given the 
reasonable doubt instruction several times, and the jurors have heard it 
from both attorneys throughout the trial. 
NOW: There is no way to perfectly create a trial experience in a 
description like this, but you should try to imagine it. Of course, a trial 
would take much longer than this reading, but try to put yourself in the 
frame of mind of someone who has heard a complete trial containing this 
information. If you were on a jury that has heard such a trial, NOW, 
ANSWER THIS QUESTION: 
WOULD YOU SAY THAT THIS DEFENDANT IS GUILTY 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, OR NOT GUILTY? 
CHECK ONE: 
 GUILTY  __________ NOT GUILTY ___________ 
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APPENDIX B 
SECOND SCENARIO USED IN EXPERIMENT 
AT THE END OF THIS DESCRIPTION, YOU WILL BE 
ASKED THIS QUESTION: “WOULD YOU SAY THAT THIS 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, 
OR NOT GUILTY?” 
The Defendant, whose name is Dee Fendant, has been on trial for 
robbery. The first witness was Courtney Cline, who testified to having 
been an attendant on duty at the Go-N-Tote on Antoine Drive in this city 
and county on the date stated in the indictment. Dee came in and walked 
slowly to the back of the store where refrigerated items are kept. Courtney 
watched carefully because Dee was looking all around. Courtney testified 
that Dee lingered in the back, within Courtney’s view, until a time when 
all customers were out of the store. Dee then hurried to the checkout 
counter, pulled out a black pistol, and demanded money. “This is a 
robbery. Give me everything in that cash register.” Courtney immediately 
complied, handing over the full contents of the cash register, while 
looking carefully at Dee, who grabbed the money and ran away toward 
the west. When asked whether that person who demanded and took the 
money was present, Courtney pointed out Dee. “Are you certain?” “Yes.” 
Courtney immediately called the police, and an officer, whom Courtney 
now knows as Officer Bob Brown, arrived “almost immediately” and took 
off in his vehicle to the west. Dee told Officer Brown that the robber had 
taken forty-five dollars, and that a faded, yellowish five-dollar bill was on 
top. No one else saw the robber. 
Courtney was cross-examined, of course, by Dee’s defense lawyer. 
“How good do you feel about identifying a person of different race, like 
Dee?” “I know that cross-racial identifications are sometimes difficult, but 
Dee has a distinctive face with a crooked nose.” “Weren’t you scared and 
looking mostly at the gun?” “Yes, I was scared, but I got a good look at 
him, and he’s very recognizable.” And there were other questions, but this 
is a sample. The cross-examination did not lessen Courtney’s credibility. 
Officer Bob Brown testified that he received a call about a robbery 
at the Go-N-Tote on Antoine and was close nearby. He got there quickly 
and briefly asked the attendant, whom he identified as Courtney Cline, 
what had happened, what was taken, what the robber looked like, and 
which way the robber was going. He got into his vehicle and took off to 
the west. He saw an individual who generally fit Courtney’s description 
of the robber. He stopped and told the individual to “Freeze.” The 
individual took off running, but within a block, Officer Brown was able 
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to make an apprehension. Asked whether he saw the individual in the 
courtroom, Officer Brown said yes and identified Dee. Immediately after 
securing his arrestee, Officer Brown conducted a search incident to arrest, 
and he found a wad of bills in Dee’s right front pocket. The bills are in an 
evidence bag, which is put into evidence. They total forty-five dollars, and 
there is a faded, yellowish five-dollar bill on top, just as Courtney said 
was taken. Dee’s other front pocket contained a small black Umarex 
pistol, just as Courtney said, and the pistol is placed in evidence. 
Again, there was cross-examination. “Did Dee have any other money 
on his person?” “Yes, a wallet in his back pocket with six dollars in it.” 
“Did you ask where Dee was going?” “Dee said, I was heading to my 
auntie’s home.” And there were other questions, but this is a sample. 
After the state rested its case, Dee Fendant took the witness stand and 
testified that someone else must have committed this crime, if anyone; 
Dee had no idea who did it. Dee does have an auntie. And Dee testified 
that that was where Dee was going. 
On cross examination, Dee admitted that actually, the auntie doesn’t 
live anywhere near where he was headed. “Why’d you run from the 
police?” “I’m not sure. I was scared of going to jail.” “Where do you claim 
you got the money?” “Washing dishes in the neighborhood.” Again, there 
were more questions, but this is a representative sample. 
And also, Dee’s credibility was impeached by the fact that four years 
ago, he was convicted of theft and spent two years in prison. A “prison 
packet” containing Dee’s photograph, the judgment, the sentence, and a 
set of fingerprints was introduced into evidence, showing Dee’s 
conviction for theft. A fingerprint analyst testifies that the fingerprints in 
the prison packet match a set taken by the analyst from Dee. The picture 
is Dee’s. 
You may assume that all required elements in this case are covered 
by sufficient evidence corresponding to the indictment, and the only 
question is the identification of Dee as the robber. 
The judge gives instructions to the jury, of which you are a member. 
These include an instruction that the defendant must be acquitted unless 
guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, the jury is given the 
reasonable doubt instruction several times, and the jurors have heard it 
from both attorneys throughout the trial. 
The judge also gives a limiting instruction telling the jurors that the 
theft conviction is to be used only for the limited purpose of helping to 
judge Dee’s credibility, if it does help in that, and not as creating an 
inference that he is a robber. 
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NOW: There is no way to perfectly create a trial experience in a 
description like this, but you should try to imagine it. Of course, a trial 
would take much longer than this reading, but try to put yourself in the 
frame of mind of someone who has heard a complete trial containing this 
information. If you were on a jury that has heard such a trial, NOW, 
ANSWER THIS QUESTION: 
WOULD YOU SAY THAT THIS DEFENDANT IS GUILTY 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, OR NOT GUILTY? 
CHECK ONE: 
 GUILTY  __________ NOT GUILTY ___________ 
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APPENDIX C 
CALCULATING A NEW PROBABILITY WHEN THERE IS 
NEW EVIDENCE: BAYES’ THEOREM 
What Bayes’ Theorem Demonstrates. Given an initial probability, 
Bayes’ Theorem provides a mathematical equation for computing a 
revised probability, resulting from an independent additional piece of 
information. In other words, Bayes’ Theorem provides a quantitative 
method for adjusting the computation of a probability, based upon new 
evidence. The theorem is named after Reverend Thomas Bayes, who 
discovered it during the 1800’s. Today, Baysean analysis is used for some 
kinds of legal problems, as we shall see. 
If the new information is such that its random occurrence is 
extremely unlikely (e.g., possession of a roll of bills totaling exactly $ 
45.00 with a faded $ 5.00 bill on top), then the adjustment to even a 
moderate initial probability, such as 0.5, may produce a probability 
surprisingly close to 1.0. Without going through the exercise represented 
by Bayes’ Theorem, one might underestimate this probability. Similarly, 
if the initial probability is low, say 0.1, and the additional information is 
such that its random occurrence is not unlikely, the probability, as 
adjusted, will likely still be low. Intuition might cause one to overvalue it. 
An Intuitive Concept of Bayes’ Theorem. But now, imagine we get a 
key piece of new information: The first coin flip has turned up 
heads. Now, what are the new odds, or “Oddsnew” of two heads? The 
answer is that we simply multiply the old odds (Odds initial) by something 
called the “likelihood ratio” to compute the new odds, or Odds new: 
Oddsnew = (Likelihood Ratio) x Oddsinitial. 
In other words, it is intuitively obvious that the odds change when 
we get new information. How much do they change? The answer also is 
intuitively obvious: The odds change in proportion to the likelihood of the 
new information turning up if the event were going to happen, as versus 
if it were not. This proportion is what we call the likelihood ratio. 
The Likelihood Ratio: A Member Equal to the Probability of the New 
Information Appearing if the Event Were GOING to Happen, Divided by 
the Probability of the New Information Appearing if the Event Were NOT 
Going to Happen. This is the likelihood ratio: the ratio of two 
probabilities of the new information. Let Peviftrue be the probability of 
this new evidence appearing if the proposition were true (if the event is 
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going to occur). Let Pevifnot be the probability of the new evidence if not 
(if the event is not going to occur). Then: 
Likelihood Ratio = Peviftrue / Pevifnot. 
And Bayes Theorem becomes: 
Oddsnew = ( Peviftrue / Pevifnot ) x Oddsinitial.
This simple, four-factor equation is all there is to Bayes’ Theorem. In 
English, it means that to compute new odds of the truth of a proposition 
based on new evidence, you multiply the old odds by the ratio of the 
probability of seeing the new evidence if the proposition is true to the 
probability of seeing the new evidence if it is not. It should be added, 
however, that this terminology is not standard, and the theorem is usually 
stated in terms of probabilities without odds. This equation is equivalent 
and much easier to teach or learn. 
Using Bayes’ Theorem as a Heuristic Device. One way to use Bayes’ 
Theorem is to make a chart that lists a range of initial odds, and then to 
apply Bayes’ Theorem to combine the new evidence with all of the 
possible initial odds in the chart. Thus, in our example, imagine that there 
were only one in 1,000 odds that a randomly chosen person would possess 
the $ 45.00 with a faded $ 5.00 bill on top, and the initial odds are 
subjective: the evaluation of an eyewitness identification. (One in 1,000 
seems a very conservative estimate, but it leads to very high new odds.) 
What if we think the initial odds are only one to nine? Or two to eight? We 
can apply Bayes’ Theorem to each possible set of initial odds. And so, we 
construct our chart, as in Figure 1:  
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Figure 1: Chart for Heuristic Use of Bayes’ Theorem, 
with New Evidence at 1:1,000 Odds 
Initial Estimated Odds of 
Correctness 
New Odds 
0:1 (certainty of error) 0:1 (zero probability) 
1:9 111:1 (111/112 probability = .99107) 
2:8, or 1:4 250:1 (250/251 probability = .99602) 
3:7 429:1 (429/430 probability = .99767) 
4:6, or 2:3 667:1 (667/668 probability = .99850) 
5:5, or 1:1 1000:1 1000/1001 probability = .99900) 
6:4, or 3:2 1500:1 (1500/1501 probability = .99933) 
7:3 2333:1 (2333/2334 probability = .99957) 
8:2, or 4:1 4000:1 (4000/4001 probability = .99975) 
9:1 9000:1 (9000/9001 probability = .99989) 
1:0 (certainty of correctness)    1:0 (1.0 probability) 
This chart enables us to use Bayes’ Theorem as a heuristic, or 
investigative device. It shows us visually the impact of the 1,000:1 
random-selection blood evidence. What is striking is that even with very 
low initial odds, such as one to nine, we get more than one-hundred-to-
one new odds. This is because of the power of the new evidence: 1,000 to 
one against a random person having the characteristics at issue. Without 
Bayes’ Theorem, we might underestimate the new probability. 
Use of Bayes’ Theorem in Law and Public Policy. Bayes’ Theorem 
may provide guidance in evaluating increments of circumstantial 
evidence. For example, imagine that eyewitness identifications are strong 
but uncertain, leading to a 0.7 probability that the defendant is the 
perpetrator. But imagine, also, that the defendant was apprehended shortly 
after the crime in possession of an item of property corresponding to one 
taken in the robbery, an item that only one in one thousand people in the 
general population usually possesses under similar circumstances. 
This additional, circumstantial piece of information produces a 
higher revised probability than one might guess. In fact, the probability is 
.99957 (see above). In some legal applications, it may even be possible to 
use Bayes’ Theorem in mathematical form to produce evidence that a 
party might wish to offer in court. 
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